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1 Introduction
Blockchain, Smart Contracts and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) are be-
ing touted to revolutionise digital services – through decentralisation. Cryptocur-
rencies, self-sovereign identities, decentralised certificate registries, and transpar-
ent voting systems are but a few applications which promise to empower end
users and provide assurances that neither data nor the associated computational
logic have been tampered with.
Satoshi Nakamoto, whoever the individual or group may be, proposed a tech-
nology, Blockchain, which can be used to implement a ledger of digital assets
ownership in a decentralised manner, and used it to create the first such cryp-
tocurrency, Bitcoin [Nakamoto, 2008]. Bitcoin’s genesis block (the first block
mined) included the text “The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of sec-
ond bailout for banks” — a clear statement that Bitcoin was intended to chal-
lenge the existing banking regime, and may also support claims that Bitcoin
emerged as a response to the 2007/8 financial crisis. Decentralised ‘money’ was
just the beginning. Shortly afterwards came the advent of smart contracts (as
originally conceptualised by Nick Szabo [Szabo, 1997] and later implemented on
the Ethereum blockchain [Wood et al., 2014]) — deterministic computer code
that can be executed in a distributed and decentralised manner, and which en-
ables new types of trusted, yet decentralised digital processes.
Decentralisation, disintermediation, transparency, verifiability, auditability,
openness, inclusion, tamper-proof, immutability are just some of the buzzwords
that continue to be swung around in the promotion of the benefits brought
about by Blockchain-based systems to the users. The rhetoric used creates par-
allels between the features brought about through blockchains and values that
many try to uphold, for example honesty, openness, transparency, teamwork and
unchanging truth.
From this rhetoric, together with the often heard chant from blockchain
evangelists of “Decentralise Everything!”, it may be construed that applying
Blockchain and DLTs to any process is key to achieve the ultimate common
good. However, individual user benefits do not necessarily translate into benefits
⋆ This paper was prepared for The Common Good in the Digital Age conference held
in the Vatican City State, between 26-28 September 2019.
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for the common good — and as hinted by Aristotle and in the New Testament,
it is the noble common good that we should strive towards:
“For even if the good is the same for an individual as for a city, that of
the city is obviously a greater and more complete thing to obtain and
preserve.” – Aristotle [Aristotle, 2000]
“3 Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility
value others above yourselves, 4 not looking to your own interests but
each of you to the interests of the others.” – Philippians 2:3–4 (NIV)
In this paper a number of blockchain applications aimed at supporting ini-
tiatives for common good are highlighted. This is followed by a discussion on
technology de/centralisation and a thought experiment used to raise questions
regarding the use of decentralised technology in terms of social implications. We
close the paper with some parting thoughts, highlighting the more important
questions and challenges we leave pending.
2 Common Good Blockchain Use Cases
Three typical types of use cases will now be presented where blockchain systems
can be used for common good including: providing a means of providing banking
for the unbanked; implementing mechanisms to assure fair and ethical processes;
and community empowerment.
2.1 Financial Inclusion
According to the Global Findex Database issued in 2017 by the World Bank
[Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018] 1.7 billion adults worldwide (corresponding to 31%
of adults) are unbanked. Having no access to a bank account means they may
not be able to get access to potential important services that may require bank
statements when signing up. The main factors for the unbanked can be classified
as: (i) logistical or financial reasons including limited or no physical access to
financial institutions, not having enough funds to open or operate an account,
costs of operating an account are too expensive, and lack of identification; or (ii)
social reasons including reliance on family members who have accounts, religious
reasons, and lack of trust in financial institutions [Lichtfous et al., 2018].
It is also reported, however, that of these unbanked adults, two-thirds own a
mobile phone. The use of cryptocurrencies and blockchain through such devices
can overcome the logistical, financial and social hurdles listed. Blockchain and
DLTs deal precisely with disintermediation and the removal of central points
of trust previously required, and may thus have the desired characteristics for
individuals that lack trust in financial institutions to be more open to using
cryptocurrencies. Depending upon the underlying religious belief that is stop-
ping someone from using a bank account, cryptocurrencies may or may not
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provide a solution for them to gain access to bank-like features using cryptocur-
rencies. There is however little that cryptocurrencies can do for individuals who
are reliant on family members, though access to blockchain based services may
become more accessible.
Although cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based solutions could provide the
technical mechanism to overcome these issues, depending upon the jurisdiction
they may only provide a partial or temporary solution. As cryptocurrencies (and
other money-like assets) may be subject to the law of the land which may out-
right ban them, regulate them, or simply say nothing at all about them. Having
a regulatory framework in place which addresses such assets based on their par-
ticular features is obviously an ideal situation as it provides legal certainty to end
users, enabling them to understand rules and potential risks. Outright banning
cryptocurrencies or blockchain-based systems that could enable financial inclu-
sion in a jurisdiction is a show-stopper, at least for those individuals that want
to abide by the law. Whilst jurisdictions that do not provide crypto-regulation
do allow for the unbanked to gain financial inclusion, but with the risk that this
may be only temporary until the jurisdiction puts such regulation into place.
This creates an uneasy environment whereby cryptocurrency owners may fear
that their assets would be confiscated or devalued.
2.2 Assuring Fair and Ethical Supply Chains
Human rights, fair trade, environmental friendliness and other ethical terms and
initiatives have been making headlines and surrounded our everyday lives for a
while now — but are we there yet?
In a 2018 Nature Sustainability paper Nkulu et al. [Nkulu et al., 2018] re-
veal how those working and living in areas surrounding cobalt1 mining areas
had much higher levels of cobalt in their blood and urine, of which “were most
pronounced for children”, in some of whom evidence was also found of DNA
damage.
A 2017 report [International Labour Office, 2017] highlighted that 152 mil-
lion children are victims of child labor, out of which 73 million work in hazardous
conditions.
When we buy products, typically, we need to trust that fair and ethical con-
siderations and processes were used amongst the various different stakeholders
involved in the particular supply chain. Over the past decades authorities, stan-
dards bodies, non-governmental organisations and other institutions worked at
implementing procedures and standards which would provide more assurances in
respect to such fair and ethical processes. However, often such processes include
spot-checks, and sampling of products and services which still leave room for
foul play — since only a sample would be checked suppliers could mix in both
licensed and unlicensed products together.
A blockchain based-supply chain solution could enable each stakeholder to
input and/or verify the work they have done and materials used. This would
1 Cobalt is a metal used for lithium-ion batteries.
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provide for a tamper-proof source to end-product trace of each process and
material used in a product. That being said, such a solution would be dependent
on each stakeholder entering true information. Such audit processes described
above could put in place to check whether stakeholders are indeed entering the
correct information to help minimise such activity.
Internet of Things (IoT) and other connected sensor devices can be used to
automatically detect real world physical supply chain events and store them into
the associated blockchain. However, it is important to note that such IoT de-
vices could also be subject to submitting erroneous or missing data whether
intentionally or not. Indeed, there are ways of addressing this: using secure
and tamper-proof devices, increasing numbers of devices for redundancy, and
allowing for different stakeholders to use their own devices to guarantee their
respective interests.
2.3 Community Empowerment
Over time corruption is either becoming more prevalent, more visible to the pub-
lic eye (perhaps due to social media), or even being announced before sufficient
(or any) evidence is available, as fake news become rampant.
A 2014 OECD report on foreign bribery states that 57% of bribery cases
were to secure public procurement contracts [OECD, 2014].
Rigging in voting from board motions, to local community affairs, to national
elections is a topic that keeps resurfacing [Jimenez et al., 2017].
Computerised systems could help in such situations to both provide for more
efficient processes as well as to put mechanisms in place to minimise potential
manipulation as much as possible. However, as long as the systems are operated,
owned or maintained by centralised entities, room is left for interference. Often
independent audits of systems are undertaken to provide assurances, however
ultimately because of their centralised nature such assurances cannot ultimately
be provided — and even if a system could be shown to be tamper-proof in such
a case, the public may still doubt it due to the inherent centralised control of
power.
Smart contracts can provide a solution to the above scenarios, by imple-
menting a tamper-proof, verifiable, auditable, publicly open system that can
enforce the required computational logic and assure that neither the logic nor
data can be tampered with. Indeed, for many types of voting systems it would
not be ideal to have individual users’ votes disclosed. Using techniques such as
zero-knowledge proofs [Goldwasser et al., 1989] it is possible to both keep secret
individuals’ votes whilst assuring that the outcome cannot be tampered with.
3 Technology De/centralisation
From the use cases described above one can note how decentralisation and with
it tamper-proof, immutable, verifiable ledgers and systems can allow for oppor-
tunities to work towards the common good.
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Decentralisation of applications, that is the complete opening and disclosure
of data and logic — does not leave room for questions to be raised with respect
to trustworthiness of the system, due to it being completely transparent. That
is of course, if an application is completely decentralised — and decentralisation
is often believed and described to be a binary option, in that either the whole
system is decentralised or centralised, both from a technology implementation
point of view and from a social governance point-of-view. The truth though,
is that unless a decentralised application (dApp) operates completely within a
decentralised environment, then it cannot be fully decentralised technology-wise.
Furthermore, even then, other points of centralisation may exist — for instance
in the logic, which may require centralised confirmation throughout its operation
(for example from an administrator).
Identifying various points of de/centralisation and their impact in achieving
the common good goals of the particular application is crucial, since certain
centralised points could ultimately defy the whole scope of the application being
used for common good and result in a waste of funds, be it public or private
funds, which in and of itself would not be in the interest of the common good.
A blockchain or DLT represents various individual computers or nodes, that
are working together to keep the distributed and decentralised ledger in check.
This may include nodes acting as miners or verifiers or any other particular
functionaries which the particular DLT requires to assure consistency and va-
lidity of the shared ledger. This layer can be seen to be the logic that allows
for distributed and decentralised nodes to operate together to provide a sin-
gle shared abstract ledger or computational machine to external users and/or
systems.
Blockchain systems rely on majority of the network of nodes to operate cor-
rectly to achieve consensus on the canonical ledger — though work shows that a
51% majority may often not be enough [Eyal and Sirer, 2018]. When we speak
about decentralisation at the DLT or blockchain level what is really implied is
that anyone who wants to take part in the network can do so. In reality though,
what level of decentralisation actually emerges? In aim of sharing mining re-
wards, individual miners often pool together to have a higher collective chance
of sharing the reward. However, once mining pools achieve substantial combined
computational power, one could argue that there is heavy reliance on the partic-
ular mining pool for correct operation of the blockchain – that is centralisation
of power. This view applies not only at the grouping of a mining pool, how-
ever one could also view this issue at the grouping level of a jurisdiction —
which may have its own beliefs, laws, social norms, etc. In fact many have raised
the question whether blockchain systems like Bitcoin provide decentralisation
[Gervais et al., 2014] when not only considering technological decentralisation
but considering social decentralisation aspects as well. The participating miners
in a blockchain work towards achieving the common good of the participating
miners which does not necessarily translate into the common good of the users
of the system or, even more importantly, to that of the common good.
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A smart contract can be considered to be nothing more than a computer pro-
gram (with particular attributes) – an app or application that executes on top of
a blockchain. The smart contract code executes on top of the decentralised DLT
(or Blockchain) however whether a smart contract provides for decentralisation
or not is dependent on its code. The DLT provides an abstract ‘One World Com-
puter’ (the abstract view of considering that all DLT nodes working together are
providing a single computer which executes programs, or smart contracts), and
the smart contracts are the computational logic that execute on top of this ‘one
world computer’ which nobody can tamper with (they will do exactly what the
code says they will do).
When writing (or using) smart contracts one needs to consider what ben-
efits are really being provided in terms of de/centralisation. Whilst the code
is tamper-proof and will execute exactly what it is written to do so, does the
particular smart contract enable for democratisation of power for the particular
service? Or is power still held by a central authority who is the smart contract’s
super-user? Really, this is lesser a question of technology implementation, and
more a question of social governance. In aim of working towards the common
good, what powers and decisions should be democratised or made by the com-
munity or users and what powers and decisions should be kept at a central
authority?
4 Enforced Social Contracts: A Thought Experiment
Agreements between parties, whether legal or otherwise, speak about the ideal
state of affairs. As opposed to classical logic, in which statements refer to the
actual state of affairs, agreements speak about the way things should be, identi-
fying rights and obligations on the parties involved. An obligation to deliver an
item before a deadline is no guarantee that the act will actually take place, and
many agreements include reparation clauses addressing when one of the parties
fails to carry out their obligations. In case of a breach not catered for by a repa-
ration within the agreement itself, the fallback is other regulatory structures be
it formal (the law) or otherwise (social pressure).
Smart contracts were proposed by Szabo as a step forward in that the con-
tract is self-executing or enforcing, such that they “make breach of contract ex-
pensive (if desired, sometimes prohibitively so) for the breacher” [Szabo, 1997].
One can argue that smart contracts have existed millennia before Szabo’s pro-
posal in 1997. If the parties involved in an agreement identify a trusted third
party, then execution of the contract can be entrusted to them — escrows, for
instance, work precisely in this manner. One could argue, however, that the third
party is just another implicit party in the agreement, and nothing stops them
from breaching the confidence entrusted to them by the parties. Szabo’s vision
was to do away with such trusted parties, a vision which was only realised with
the rise of the second generation of blockchain solutions [Wood et al., 2014], al-
lowing for the trusted execution of logic (code) without the need for such trusted
third parties.
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When it comes to community-level regulation — social contracts, whether
through formal law or through social norms, the situation is similar to that of
legal contracts. Nothing stops individuals from following behaviour going against
the social contract. Indeed, Socrates argues at length on why he should act as
prescribed by the social contract in Plato’s Crito [Plato, 2002]. The dialogue
hinges on the fact that one has a choice as to whether or not to follow a just law,
based on, or despite of, the state’s (or society’s) demand for loyalty to its rules
in the form of an underlying social contract. One can argue that Socrates’ view
is that the social contract one partakes in by being a member of a community
softly enforces that community’s underlying legislation. We use the term soft
enforcement to highlight the fact that, just like the underlying laws, nothing
stops individuals from going against the social contract. This goal of this social
pact has been argued by Rousseau [Rousseau, 2012] and later writers, to be that
of acting in the common good of that society.
The natural question that arises is on the use of technology to enforce leg-
islation and the underlying social contract in order to maximise the common
good. Smart contract technology can certainly act as the required tool to en-
able such hard enforcement. In this context it is worth mentioning the DAO (a
Decentralised Autonomous Organisation) [Chohan, 2017], which can be seen as
having been a social experiment in setting up an organisation in which decision
taking is decentralised according to fixed rules in a smart contract running on
Ethereum, ensuring that the behaviour of the organisation follows the will of its
members. Although limited in scope, it can be seen as an exploration of how
social rules on decision taking can be enforced without a centralised authority2,
and indications are that the scope of such organisations could be widened using
similar technologies.
The question, which remains unanswered though, is whether such hard en-
forcement is a desirable means of nudging or pushing the community towards
the common good. We do not claim to have an answer to this. However, we
will present a thought experiment in order to highlight why the answer to this
question is not as straightforward as one may initially hazard to think. Consider
the following setting for a thought experiment.
2 Perhaps it is worth noting here that the DAO failed because of technology malfunc-
tion — a bug in the code of the underlying smart contracts. This brings to the fore
one of the risks of technology-based enforcement of societal rules, but we will briefly
come back to this in the final section of this paper.
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Setting: Consider a fictitious land in which everyone lives in town A and works
in town B. There are two routes between the two towns (i) a short route which
typically requires a 10 minute drive, but becomes clogged when more than N
cars take it at the same time, resulting in a 20 minute trip; and (ii) a longer
route which always takes 25 minutes no matter how many cars take it. We
will assume that in any given day everyone leaves work at the same time, and
only n persons (with n < N) need to arrive to work within 10 minutes of their
departure (with the persons who need to arrive early changing from one day to
the next).
Let us start our thought experiment by resolving the use of the limited re-
source by allowing individual choice. At an individual level and that of the
community, it is desirable that since the fast route suffices for those in a hurry,
then its use is rationed and no one will ever arrive late to work.
Resolution 0: If everyone takes the fast route only when they really need
it, then the system works, with everyone arriving to work on time. But an
individual may reason that if they are the only ones taking the faster route,
then that route will still not be clogged. But the tragedy of the commons
[Hardin, 1968] hits, with everyone reasoning in this manner, and resulting in
clogging of the fast route. Everyone ends up spending 20 minutes in traffic,
with all those in a hurry arriving late. Furthermore, no one has any incentive
to switch to the slower route on the following day, since that will anyway take
longer.
Since the ideal behaviour is unlikely to emerge, we can look at ways of en-
forcing ideal behaviour in order to ensure that the behaviour of individuals is to
the benefit of the community as a whole. We will start with the use of a smart
contract style approach imposed on the use on all cars.
Resolution 1: Now imagine a social contract encoded as a smart contract
controlling everyone’s self-driving car (with no manual override), deciding which
route to take in a common good, yet decentralised manner: All those in a hurry
together with N − n of the rest (randomly chosen) taking the fast route. The
result is that all those in a hurry (and some others) will be arriving to work in
just 10 minutes.
Resolution 1 guarantees not only that all individuals will arrive on time to
work, but also that the use of the fast route is maximised and its use remaining
capacity is distributed in a just and fair manner. From a utilitarian perspective,
this is clearly an ideal route usage policy — by hard enforcing the the social con-
tract that those not in a hurry should allow those who are to use the fast route,
the community as a whole benefits, and indicates a gain over the previous soft
enforcement. There are, however, other means of enforcing the social contract.
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Resolution 2: Now imagine if this fictitious land were a dictatorship, and
instead of the social smart contract, a device is to be connected to everyone’s
car such that whenever the fast route is delayed, all those not in a hurry and
who have taken it will be thrown in jail for a week. We will assume that one
cannot know whether the fast route is delayed unless one has already commited
onself to it.
Resolution 2 is a soft enforcement implementation, in that individuals still
have a choice, albeit having a harsh disincentive to act selfishly. The underlying
threat of a week in jail imposed on the population in order to achieve the de-
sirable outcome is, however, not an ideal means of achieving the result. Many
would consider this to be a disproportionate means to an end. However, the fact
remains that this is a soft enforcement, and the hard enforcement of the smart
contract is certainly an even more draconian means of achieving the result. If
one were to consider resolution 2 to be an undesirable, perhaps even unethical
solution, resolution 1 should be perceived to be even less acceptable. And yet,
paradoxically, many would be ready to accept resolution 1 though not 2. One
aspect common to both these resolutions is that the compulsory participation
in the system. The question is thus whether the smart social contract solution
would be more ethical to adopt if participation is optional.
Resolution 3: Finally, imagine a situation in which participation in the social
smart contract is on a voluntary basis, although once joined, leaving is no longer
an option, and with the enforced agreement taking only into consideration
individuals who have already joined when distributing cars to routes. Consider
an individual who has not yet signed up. If more than N persons have already
signed up, she knows that she will never arrive to work on time when in a hurry
(since the social smart contract will be assigning N persons to the fast route).
Clearly, this means that she has an incentive to join. On the other, if there are
less than N participants, she knows that by joining she is signalling to everyone
that she has no choice but to take the fast route (since the contract will assign
the first N to that route), meaning that others will make a choice based on this
knowledge, and possibly try to optimise usage altruistically or go for the fast
route egoistically. Either way, she is better off, since the behaviour of others
will not be changing for the better. In other words, it is always advantageous
to join.
Participating in the smart social contract of resolution 3 is voluntary, and
thus not an imposed social norm. Perhaps this is a way of addressing the draco-
nian nature of compulsory participation. And yet, rationally speaking, everyone’s
best choice is to join, thus resulting in effectively being equivalent to resolution
1 (under the assumption that all potential participants are rational). Does a
choice with an option which is rationally better than another really constitute
choice, or is it simply an imposition of that option?
In this section we have used a variant of a thought experiment typically
used to illustrate the phenomenon of the tragedy of the commons, to show how
technology-driven enforcement of social contracts raises various philosophical
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questions and challenges which need to be answered. The means of achieving
the common good are not always justified, and technological possibility is not a
sufficient cause for adoption.
5 Parting Observations and Thoughts
Technology is frequently argued to be an enabler of or a means for achieving
a better world, somehow improving on the common good. However, nothing is
unidimensional, and in the end it is always a measure of the opportunities and
threats brought about by technology. In this paper we have attempted to make
observations and raise questions regarding the role blockchain can play towards
the common good. Blockchain-technology was never value-neutral. The origi-
nal paper presenting the technology vying away from traditional means (not
an industrial whitepaper or academic publication, by an anonymous author),
and is more of a (technical) manifesto with a sociopolitico-technical war-cry of
“Down with points of trust”. Even the genesis block of the first blockchain imple-
mentation contains a politically-laden message embedded inside it. Clearly, the
opportunities brought about by the technology are great, as the real-world use
cases we illustrated in Section 2 amply show. These opportunities largely revolve
around decentralising trust, decentralising control, although these in themselves
are broad terms with different interpretations or points of relevance as we have
discussed in Section 3.
One aspect of decentralised control is that of decentralised logic, which has
been used to enforce protocols of interaction between participants in the form of
smart contracts. It remains to be seen whether pushing such contract enforce-
ment to the level of social contracts is a good idea. In Section 4 we present a
thought experiment raising questions regarding the ethics of doing so but shy
away from providing answers.
Many question, however, whether when it is a technology that does away
with human or social trust requirements, whether we are simply pushing the
trust onto the technology itself. Is it simply that we are now trusting the tech-
nology? And should we do so? As mentioned in Section 4, the DAO failed due
to technology malfunction — a software bug under which the whole ‘social’ ex-
periment collapsed. The solution used to respond to that crash was to push the
trust back outside of the technology — asking miners and validators to forget all
that went wrong and rewind time back to the Garden of Eden before the fruit
of knowledge was bitten into through a blockchain fork.
References
Aristotle, 2000. Aristotle (2000). Nicomachean ethics. Translated and Edited by Roger
Crisp.
Chohan, 2017. Chohan, U. W. (2017). The decentralized autonomous organization
and governance issues. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082055
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3082055 .
Blockchain and the Common Good Reimagined 11
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018. Demirguc-Kunt, A., Klapper, L., Singer, D., Ansar, S.,
and Hess, J. (2018). The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring financial inclusion
and the fintech revolution. The World Bank.
Eyal and Sirer, 2018. Eyal, I. and Sirer, E. G. (2018). Majority is not enough: Bitcoin
mining is vulnerable. Communications of the ACM, 61(7):95–102.
Gervais et al., 2014. Gervais, A., Karame, G. O., Capkun, V., and Capkun, S. (2014).
Is bitcoin a decentralized currency? IEEE security & privacy, 12(3):54–60.
Goldwasser et al., 1989. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., and Rackoff, C. (1989). The knowl-
edge complexity of interactive proof systems. SIAM Journal on computing, 18(1):186–
208.
Hardin, 1968. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. science,
162(3859):1243–1248.
International Labour Office, 2017. International Labour Office (2017). Global esti-
mates of child labour: Results and trends, 2012-2016.
Jimenez et al., 2017. Jimenez, R., Hidalgo, M., and Klimek, P. (2017). Testing for
voter rigging in small polling stations. Science advances, 3(6):e1602363.
Lichtfous et al., 2018. Lichtfous, M., Yadav, V., and Fratino, V. (2018). Can
blockchain accelerate financial inclusion globally? Inside Issue 19 October 2018.
Nakamoto, 2008. Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system.
Nkulu et al., 2018. Nkulu, C. B. L., Casas, L., Haufroid, V., De Putter, T., Saenen,
N. D., Kayembe-Kitenge, T., Obadia, P. M., Mukoma, D. K. W., Ilunga, J.-M. L.,
Nawrot, T. S., et al. (2018). Sustainability of artisanal mining of cobalt in dr congo.
Nature sustainability, 1(9):495.
OECD, 2014. OECD (2014). OECD Foreign Bribery Report-An Analysis of the Crime
of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. OECD Publishing and Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, OECD Publishing.
Plato, 2002. Plato (2002). Plato: Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno,
Phaedo. Hackett Publishing Company. Translated by G.M.A. Grube.
Rousseau, 2012. Rousseau, J.-J. (2012). Of The Social Contract and Other Political
Writings. Penguin Classics. Translated by Quintin Hoare.
Szabo, 1997. Szabo, N. (1997). Formalizing and securing relationships on public net-
works. First Monday, 2(9).
Wood et al., 2014. Wood, G. et al. (2014). Ethereum: A secure decentralised gener-
alised transaction ledger. Ethereum project yellow paper, 151(2014):1–32.
